GUEST POST from Tru: Several critiques of Edward Feser and Aristotelian philosophy

Hey guys! Here’s something a little different tonight. A new commenter by the name of tru recently happened upon my posts on Aquinas (specifically, my critiques of Edward Feser’s “The Last Superstition” and “Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide”) and left some really thoughtful comments! You can see them in their original forms here:

Against Aquinas: An In-Depth Critique of “Natural Law” Ethics, Theology, and Metaphysics

A little late, but not too late: My Book Review of Edward Feser’s “The Last Superstition”

They were so good I asked and received tru’s permission to feature them on the blog proper itself. Tru used translation software for a little bit of help turning their thoughts from German to English, so I’ve marked my own little corrections with brackets. So without further ado, here’s what could be considered the first “guest post” on this blog!

 

In “The Last Superstition”, Feser presents his stock-conservative Catholic views with passion, anger and malice. Unfortunately, in this way the book has become more of an extremely undifferentiated and extremely one-sided polemic than a serious, sober confrontation with interesting philosophical [insights] of Thomas Aquinas, which certainly are not known to everyone.

As an Aquinas expert, Feser should also know Aristotle like his own back pocket. But here he already commits a faux pas. From an arrogant attitude, he criticizes the modern secularists for the fact that, due to their narrow and limited view on metaphysical [matters], they know only one kind of change, namely local movement. But Aristotle had already realized that there were other kinds of change. As an example of another–quantitative change, Feser then refers to the case of water becoming one degree warmer or colder. This is a mistake (of course the quality had changed) that otherwise only a first semester philosophy student could make. The fact that something like this happens to a great admirer of Aristotle is somewhat strange. Feser also omits the important information that Aristotle ultimately attributes all kinds of change to local movement, as the mechanically thinking secularists in principle have always done. But not a word from Feser about it, not even about the fact that modern physics has already said goodbye to many mechanistic principles by itself.

(Gunlord note: Here, Tru makes a good point I hadn’t brought up–there are several different kinds of change, such as purely quantitative [Something’s temperature goes from X to X+1 or X-2 or whatever), but also qualitative [Something’s shape changes] and so on. It also seems that Aristotle’s explanation of change has to do with local movement more than Feser lets on, but I’m not as familiar with Aristotle’s original work as I am with Feser’s interpretation of him, so I’ll defer to Tru here).

 

Feser makes a lot of fuss about the fact that the secularists would not recognize the true basis of morality, more precisely the Platonic and Aristotelian forms. An immoral consequence of this misconception is the current high number of abortions worldwide, which are carried out without hesitation and without penal consequences. But Feser must keep one thing in mind. If even the fathers and discoverers (or only inventors?) of these philosophical forms/ideas could not see that infanticide (which they advocated under certain circumstances, especially in the case of disabilities and deformities) is something absolutely reprehensible, how can today’s secularists, who are extremely superficial in Feser’s eyes, let alone the uneducated, be capable of it?

Furthermore, Feser is not always completely honest with his readers. At least he often seems to keep important information behind the scenes. In the chapter about evil, Feser says that terrible suffering in this world is basically outweighed by eternally blessed visions in the hereafter. The victims of the Holocaust, for example, would not have suffered so much in vain. As a Catholic theologian, however, he must honestly admit that a very painful life alone is not enough to qualify as a promising candidate for a heavenly reward. One must at least be or have been a good Catholic, otherwise the papal church would make no sense in the end. Feser obviously could not bring [himself] to say that a Jew in a concentration camp who suffered terribly there and was tortured to death, perhaps even had to expect eternal hell (see also [the ruling] of the Council of Florence, 1442: [The Holy Roman Church …believes firmly, confesses and proclaims that no one outside the Catholic Church, neither pagan nor Jew nor unbeliever, or a person separated from unity, will participate in eternal life, but rather fall into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels if he does not join her [the Church] before death.)

Speaking of hell. According to Feser, nature wants us to give birth to many children. That’s why we should do it for moral reasons (natural law). But isn’t it a little cruel to irrevocably expose your children to the possible danger of ending up in hell? One can do one’s best in education, but the development of children is not always in the hands of parents. The children could fall away from their faith as adults and stand with one foot in the kingdom of Satan.

The first proof of God was not really convincing. What does it look like? I hold a stick in my hand with which I move a stone. This is a simultaneous causal series: arm, stick and stone, all moving simultaneously and in relation to each other. Feser believes that the series must end with a unmoved mover (immovable God). When it comes to determining which causal link is “in front” of the arm, Feser suddenly starts an [inward-looking] analysis. He comes to elementary forces, atoms and other physical properties. Why is Feser doing this? The inward-looking analysis still remains in the arm, I can zoom into it as deeply as I want, it does not lead us out of it. Either I go through the individual parts of the arm or I leave it completely in order to really expand the causal series. A third possibility is excluded. Moreover, it is surprising why Feser suddenly uses the language of modern physics, which actually contradicts his Aristotelian philosophy. I can also save myself the search for another link in the causal series and go straight to God. Whether there are still one or two things in between (i.e. between my arm and the unmoved mover) does not change anything about the conception of the supposed proof of God. But if I now fall back on God, he is also the one who moves my arm. That would only degrade me to a puppet of God. On the other hand, I could say that my intention moved my arm and with it the stick and the stone. So I no longer have to refer to God. The causal series ends with my intention, which has emerged spontaneously from my active will and has no (essential) cause, but a (accidental) reason for action. Feser’s argument merely showed that although there must be a primary mover, it only needs to be active in the respect that is relevant to the given case of movement. Nothing more. There is no reason to cite God for this, who according to Feser is active in every possible respect (pure actuality). This results in many worldly first movers, such as man, for example. Aristotle also saw it this way: “e.g. the stick moves the stone and is moved by the hand, which again is moved by the man: in the man, however, we have reached a [movement] that is not so in virtue of being moved by something else.” (Physics 256a-256b) The two other cosmological proofs of God (Aquinas names all proofs only paths to God) have already been refuted once and for all by Kant.

(Gunlord note: Here, Tru makes the point that the human soul could be considered a first mover, in a certain sense. This is something I’ve wanted to write more about for a little while, but it seems like Tru put it into words before I could–great minds think alike! I’ll credit Tru when I get the post up, eventually XD)

Feser’s weakest arguments can be found in the chapter on the universal acid. I expected much more from Feser. But so little came. The mere assumption of purpose and [formal] causes (which plants also have) should solve the profound problem of freedom of will in no time at all? This is downright ridiculous. Feser dedicates very few pages to this topic. But it is the most important and central theme of philosophy. If there is no free will, there is no morality. But any kind of essentialism (including Aristotelian) unfortunately excludes freedom of will in principle. Every essence (like that of the individual human being) can only act according to its essence, it cannot break through its essence (character and personality of a human being) without breaking itself. A genuine arbitrariness or freedom that somehow acts independently or outside of one’s own being is unthinkable (it would not be in our understanding a freedom that leads to responsibility, it would be determined by others, not self-determined), as well as one that occurs together with it as an inseparable unity (this would be logically absurd). Even the Thomistic conception that no potential (like certain potential human actions) can realize itself and thus requires something else from outside from which it is realized (circumstances that trigger those actions) makes it difficult to rationally grasp freedom of will. In the end, one must be content, for better or for worse, with a purely fideistic assumption of freedom of will.

The true universal acid, the really dangerous idea, is that of evolution. Dennett is right. If the theory of evolution is correct, then at least in the organic world there are no fixed Aristotelian forms. A squirrel, for example, with all its abilities and qualities, is a product of mercilessly brutal natural selection. And every generation of squirrels could undergo a change over time, which in turn would affect subsequent generations. Change would be part of their essence. Finally, man has evolved evolutionarily, so that even from a [hylomorphic] point of view it is no longer possible to speak of a metaphysical species of man (only of a biological species in a very loose sense). When it comes to morality, one can immediately ask oneself how nature in its organic form can at all be a firm and credible yardstick for moral action (that is what Feser assumes), if it is demonstrably subject to a constant evolutionary process?

I have noticed that Feser, who begins his book with explanations of Parmenides and arrives at Aquinas after a few stops, nevertheless, without intending to, returns in principle to the philosophy of Parmenides. For Parmenides there is only one existence, namely pure being, unique, indistinguishable and unchangeable, as Feser points out. Now one has to read what Feser has to tell about the God of Aquinas. To put it bluntly, it is the same as with Parmenides. The qualities of the Thomistic God are actually only different possibilities to refer to the sole pure being. While Parmenides speaks of illusions of diversity, Feser speaks of imperfect reflections in Aquinas. Feser’s course of argumentation, which runs through the entire book, thus takes a somewhat absurd turn. In the end, the God of Aquinas is the God of [the Eleatics], whom Feser had not really taken seriously and smiled at. This God in Thomistic garb would be, so to speak, a puppet player (already hinted at earlier) and we would be his puppets, which only really exist when he plays with them (if he should no longer play with them and throw them into a corner, he would have to look at them or at least think of them, otherwise they would immediately pass into nothingness). But while this God is playing, he falls into a strange deception, the deception that the puppets act on their own responsibility, autonomously and independently from him. He simply forgets while playing that he is pulling the strings, that he is solely responsible for every movement, power, existence, purposefulness, form and matter of the puppets. What is tragicomically added: For some reason (now as a blinded pseudo-viewer) their behavior doesn’t please him at all. The abstruse consequence is that he punishes them ( actually a part of himself) for it. The Thomistic God is not only the God of eleatics, but above all a God of self-deception.

The only thing that I can give Feser a halfway positive credit for is that he repeatedly points to important questions in philosophy, such as those concerning universals and teleology (questions that a philosopher or scientist cannot easily dismiss with a shrug of the shoulders).

There is one more thing I want to [address]. Feser’s constant complaints about modern times or modernity, that it has moved away from Aristotle to its great disadvantage, are not only somewhat annoying, but also partly inappropriate. For modern times did not simply distance itself from Aristotle without a goal. For various reasons it moved more in the direction of Plato again and took up elements and basic ideas of his philosophy in order to integrate them into its systems. These systems may have little in common with Plato’s philosophy here and there (if there ever was a closed one), but they must still be called Platonic (humanism or modern cosmology, for example, are or contain platonisms). Probably the current academic consensus also sees Plato (who is also highly esteemed by Feser) as the greater philosopher than Aristotle (who is completely anti-philosophy-of-language, anti-existential-philosophy, epistemologically totally naive and with outdated scientific assumptions), as seen in the Renaissance. Therefore Feser’s outcry actually echoes into nowhere.

[To return to] my criticism of the first way to God, I refer mainly to Scott McDonald ( Aquinas’s Parasitic Cosmological Argument), whom Feser also mentions and [who] seems to be a Catholic theologian.

“There is, however, another problem for the proof. Assuming that Aquinas can block a regress in the case of movers and things moved, why must the primary mover be not just unmoved, but unmovable? Aquinas thinks that if the mover of some moved thing is not itself moved, it is an unmovable mover (premises 5 and 7). What justification does he have for supposing that an unmoved mover is unmovable?

The sort of causal series he has in mind in the proof from motion has as a member
something, M, that is being moved. M’s going from being in potentiality with respect to some state S to being in actuality with respect to S needs to be explained by some primary mover, P.

All that is required of P is that it be in actuality with respect to S; P’s being in actuality with respect to S is what makes P the primary mover in this causal series ordered per se. So in order to count as a primary mover, as the stopping point in a causal series ordered per se, P must be unmoved (because it is in actuality) in the relevant respect. But it does not follow from this that P must be unmoved (and hence in actuality) in all respects. If P were in actuality in all respects, P would be absolutely unmoved and unmovable, but the fact that P is unmoved with respect to some state S does not entail that P is unmovable. Given that Aquinas’s argument so far has shown only that there must be some primary mover that is in actuality in the respect relevant to the particular case of motion at hand, it seems likely that there will be very many relatively uninteresting primary movers. The fire in our paradigm case seems to be a suitable primary mover, animals (or their souls) might be unmoved movers, and some of Aquinas’s own examples of causal series ordered per se apparently have human beings filling the role of primary mover, at least as Aquinas describes them. We might call fire, animals, human beings, and other natural unmoved movers (if there are any) mundane primary movers. The problem, then, is that the proof from motion gives us no reason to suppose there are any primary movers other than mundane primary movers.“

The first proof is questioned by many Thomists. Here is an example by George A. Blair in [“Another Look at St. Thomas’ ‘First Way’]:

“I do believe that in Thomism there is a valid argument for the existence of God, based on the distinction between essence and existence and its implications. But I think that it is time that Thomists stopped taking the Five Ways as something sacred, especially the First Way. Attempts to validate it only achieve the result of disguising the really valid argument, and making the valid argument appear less valid than it really is.“

Finally, [some remarks on natural law morality:]

I. My biggest problems I have with the classical thomistic theory of natural law are the following: In my opinion, natural law cannot be reconciled with some fundamental Christian ideas, nor with important findings of modern science. Contemporary theories of action and many philosophers of the mind would also have their great problems with natural law. Compatibility with the Christian doctrine of original sin? If the whole of nature is sinful, i.e. morally reprehensible in itself, how can it at all be a yardstick for truly moral action? Here a voice of a Bible Christian, which might be representative for many Christians: “For the Christian, however, nature is not the standard, because the world of nature is a fallen world, a world in rebellion against God and infected by sin and death. For a standard, we must look beyond nature to God.” (Rousas John Rushdoony) Feser does not go into this problem at all. How far does sin extend to him? The whole of nature or only certain parts of it or everything in the world except the spirit? Secretly, Feser seems, as I suspect, to represent a Pelagianism that completely denies an inherited original sin, the Augustinian original sin. In any case, for me one thing is certain: an ethic of natural law is only compatible with heretical Pelagianism. Compatibility with a moral ought? How can a moral ought be derived from the mere fact that almost all human organs and abilities are teleologically structured? Without the presence of at least one second being capable of self-reflection, I simply cannot have a ” ought “, let alone a moral one. A demand of another rational person is the essential premise for the fact that [her] will can reach me as ought. How does this logic of action look more precise? The first step would look something like this: For example, a person asks me for help by turning to me and saying, “Help me! Please” which means “I want you to help me”. I immediately understand that to mean that I should help her because she wants me to help her. Thus we have gone from a foreign will to a ought in me. We indeed need God as a morality demanding being, be it directly through a revelation or be it indirectly through the purposefulness of human nature. Therefore, in order to function at all, a sophisticated divine-command theory would have to be incorporated into natural law, so that God can somehow indirectly guide us to good action. Under the metaphysical conditions of Thomism, however, I see no possibility for this.

Moreover, we would be morally dependent on the complete arbitrariness of God. For he could have created another nature at will, thus another morality, and could still do so. If God orders nature teleologically, it remains unclear whether this order corresponds at all to his will [as it pertains to] how we have to behave. Even if it would correspond to his will in this sense, it remains questionable whether his demands on us are really morally binding, [or] whether they are at all morally good.

Compatibility with a monistic soul theory? If body and mind together form a true hylemorphistic unity, so that in the end physical processes influence the mind and vice versa, the question arises how one can be sure of the right insight into natural law. If someone suffers from a mental or physical illness and thinks he knows exactly what natural law should look like, how much faith can one give to that person? Diseases can affect both judgment and cognition. A blind person, for example, has his or her own access to things and their qualities. A severely manic-depressive person should not be too sure in questions of ethics, especially natural law ethics.

Serious epistemological difficulties of naive realism, which Aristotle advocates, are not even discussed here. Cultural influences, deep-rooted customs and traditions could also be further obstacles to grasping man’s true teleology unclouded and free of error. One example would be circumcision. Certain religions support this practice without any ifs or buts, even though, strictly speaking, it represents a mutilation of the sexual organ, i.e. [a] contrast to its teleology. That circumcision is an ethical offence would never be understood by these religions. A tradition thousands of years old has, so to speak, blinded them in this respect. Perhaps the Western world has also become partially blind through cultural patriarchy? Or later by postmodernism? Perhaps all people are simply without sight, including the Kantians, who cannot find access into Feser’s natural law? Or the natural lawyers are too blind to be able to say that there is no natural law. For Aristotle himself, recognizing a real purpose even from a physically and mentally healthy state was not a completely simple thing. The more the material is involved in the creation of an object, the more unclear the purpose can be for the scientist. Then one could ask oneself: “Do acting persons, for example, first have to ask zoological experts in order to find out what the nature of man contains?”

In order to avoid the epistemological problems, Aristotle had to accept a strict speculative body-mind dualism, so that a reliable recognizability of the beings of things is ensured in principle (a spirit in a living organism instead of in a Cartesian machine). Compatibility with biological evolution? How can nature in its organic form provide a solid and credible yardstick for moral action if it is proven to be subject to a constant evolutionary process that is mercilessly brutal. For some, nature is even subject to constant change in all its facets. However, one does not need to go that far to question natural law. Just the ability of an organism to survive and reproduce and the specific characteristics which go hand in hand with that ability and which have developed in the course of natural selection and can still change from generation to generation (already existing organs could either receive additional functions in the course of evolution or they could simply atrophy until complete inactivity) are unlikely to be helpful in moral decisions. Unless you are a follower of social Darwinism.

Apart from that, if you want to look at evolution as a guide to “find out how people should behave, we must first ask to what goal evolution is heading. (Robert Wright) But any goal would be based on pure speculation; and it looks more like there is no goal. In addition, natural law ethics would have to follow the course of human evolution, that is, in principle it would have to gradually adapt (This may be slow, but in theory it doesn’t change anything) to this course in order to remain up to date with the latest ethical standards (It remains to be seen whether it should stick to the average person or to extraordinary and exceptional people). However, this is not compatible with the idea of a single true, eternal, objective morality. The Book of Nature is not written down once and for all, it rewrites itself here and there. Even if all problems of the four mentioned points were solved, one would need a convincing proof of God on the one hand.

On the other hand, freedom of will should not only be proven, but also made comprehensible conceptually. Otherwise one would only have to postulate both, God and the freedom of will, and blindly rely on their existence. Since the concept of freedom of will is extremely problematic and no proof of God is ultimately convincing from a religiously neutral perspective, every moral theory is, for better or for worse, in a state of limbo.

(Gunlord note: Excellent points here, touching on something I want to get to later: Despite Feser’s attempts, essentialism, particularly in regards to morality, isn’t really compatible with evolutionary theory, which necessitates that the “Forms” or “Essences” of things constantly change over time. If a dinosaur possessed a certain essence in, say, 10 million BC that dictated certain things were bad for it, 10 million years later its descendants would have evolved into birds, whose essence now dictates that the formerly bad things are now good for it. It is obvious this has some rather dire implications for human morality, given how human beings have changed both physically and culturally over the years)

II. Feser confidently asserts the following sentence, which is of great ethical importance to him: “Every sexual act may only serve the purpose of reproduction”. For Feser, this sentence is apparently self-evident and immediately obvious as an axiom. But how can I reliably recognize that ejaculation may only take place in the vagina for the purpose of reproduction and nowhere else? How can I completely rule out that there are other purposes of sexuality? The fact that the ejaculate in the vagina often, but not too often (actually rather rarely), causes reproduction does not prove that there is only one natural purpose of the sexual act. There may be other natural forms of sexuality that serve other natural purposes. The Thomist basically cannot logically rule this out. At most he could say: It may be that there is still one or another purpose. Since I cannot see it myself, but only have the one who serves reproduction clearly in mind, I do not want to take any unnecessary moral risk. If, however, there are other forms of sexuality, one must admit that the realization of their specific purposes does not automatically lead to the frustration of the reproductive purpose. For this is no longer what matters at all at the moment another is realized. You can understand this better if you look into the animal kingdom, which [Aquinas] likes to do. In many cases the sexual behaviour of animals is not only about reproduction. The least that can be said on this subject is that a sexual stimulation that an animal carries out on itself or that is brought about by members of the same species (whether heterosexual or homosexual) is quite normal in the animal world without there being a reproductive purpose. And sometimes the sodomitic activities of the animals even lead to a wasted ejaculation, as with the orangutans. Of particular interest is the case of a desert squirrel (Cape Ground Squirrels) where males occasionally perform autofellatio. After an ordinary copulation with a female, the male satisfies himself orally and swallows his own seed. The purpose of this procedure, according to the researchers, is to clean the semen ducts and ureters. An infection is to be avoided thereby. Urine would be too expensive and a waste of liquid. One can now make a simple thought experiment with that squirrel, which is just satisfying itself, by giving it “from the outside” a spirit, which, according to Aristotle, also comes “from the outside” in humans. Thus the male with his new consciousness can encounter moral mines in every one of his actions. After ejaculation, however, one cannot accuse him of having violated the purpose of reproduction and thus sinned. This would be ridiculous. Reproduction really didn’t play a role at that moment. The cleaning purpose was alone given and decisive.

Let the female bonobos also have a spirit [a rational ability to talk to us] and ask them if they would cross something in their nature if they rub their clitoris together to orgasm. From their point of view, their sexual behaviour would reduce social tensions and build social bonds. That would be more than justified teleologically. For Aquinas, too, there is the higher purpose of sociability and the social. [Sin is not a] teleological deviation if it serves a legitimate higher purpose.

In my opinion one could assume three further equal purposes of sexuality besides reproduction, which do not seem abstruse or far-fetched, but correspond to a certain Common Sense. And what has been said before would also apply to them, namely that as soon as one of these purposes is pursued and fulfilled, the others do not play a role, because in principle they did not exist at that moment, so that they were not up for debate. Moreover, for logical reasons, an activity can have only one particular final cause at a particular time. The proposition of contradiction excludes that several purposes can belong to the same thing at the same time:

1. personal maturity: if you want to start a family responsibly, you should definitely have reached a certain degree of maturity beforehand. Everyone would agree to that. It is now undeniable that the process of personal maturation, along with many other very important factors, includes everything sexual, including sexual activities that are not linked to marriage or reproduction. It is therefore expressly stated: “Sexual development is a part of personality development and begins with birth”. Experts also say that psychosexual development cannot be separated from cognitive maturation processes. Even in infancy, a lot happens in the sexual sphere, which Freud recognised at his time. Dry orgasms come about through masturbation or randomly fitting body positions, both in boys and girls. With the onset of puberty, boys then experience nocturnal, often involuntary ejaculations, in which nature itself, incidentally, would have to thwart its own purposes on a gigantic scale. Then one matures above all in contact with other children, which also includes the encounter with the opposite sex, an encounter which will inevitably have a sexual touch. Feser could hardly deny that one has to bring a certain personal maturity into a marriage in order for it to become reasonably stable. Many yery young men have to „to sow one’s wild oats” before they are ready for the bond of marriage. I don’t think Feser will want to say that a thirteen-year-old boy who “makes out” with a thirteen-year-old girl is immediately committed to reproduction and marriage. It’s clear that this can’t have a future and is part of the Coming of Age process. Nature has “theoretically” already given them the physical sexual maturity and a minimum of intelligence for a marriage, but the personal maturity is still completely lacking. When this personal maturity is attained one day, it also disappears from the stage as the final cause, so to speak. Until then, however, much could be safely subordinated to it. Only every healthy person attains it at a slightly different age and by different means. If you look at the sexual development of humans from 1 – 12 years of age, you can hardly speak of violations of natural law in these phases.

(Gunlord note: Tru’s comments about nocturnal emission are *precisely* a point I plan to make in another work, though I hadn’t spoken to him before these comments and I’ve been working on that other thing for quite a while! Great minds do think alike…I guess I’ll have to give him some credit in a footnote, just to be safe XD)

2. love: The human being is perhaps primarily a spiritual, emotional and erotic being and secondarily an animal and voluptuous one. The spiritual, emotional and erotic union between two people, which can happen in the sexual act, but does not have to, is an expression of true love and affection. Feser introduces this purpose only very briefly, without illuminating it further, let alone justifying it, so that it appears like a strange, curious element in his remarks on sexual morality. The purpose of union can be considered either as equal to the purpose of reproduction or only secondary like any other tender action that does not directly serve the purpose of reproduction. However, if it were merely secondary, it would either have to be completely negligible, so that it would not matter whether married couples love each other at all. Or it is an obligatory means for reproductive purposes such as ejaculation in the vagina. I do not think that either would be in Feser’s interest. Ergo the purpose of love is equal to the purpose of reproduction. From a Catholic married couple who are bound together forever by a single sexual act, but who since this act cannot stand each other to the death, but nevertheless does not want to renounce sex, one cannot demand the spiritual, emotional and erotic purpose of union. It is well known that love as a feeling cannot be enforced. Anything else would be simply and poignantly absurd, whereby that marriage is already based on an absurd foundation.

3. health: sex is proven to be healthy for body and mind. It strengthens the immune system, counteracts depression and reduces frustration. This alone represents a higher purpose than mere pleasure and fun. Aristotle also acknowledges the purpose of health under certain circumstances, when he says: “So four or five years after reaching this age limit [55 years] one should abstain from the production of children to be publicly recognized and show for the consequence that one only performs conjugal intercourse for the sake of health or for any other reasonable reason”. And also in Thomistic natural law, self-preservation, by which one must primarily understand the preservation of one’s own health, is a higher purpose to which one can temporarily sacrifice various bodily functions. Feser brings only a radical example of a necessary amputation of a limb to stay alive. But what would he say about a semen sample that you absolutely need if you are to undergo a vital examination? Now the Thomists have ethically placed reproduction above self-preservation, making it more important than self-preservation. Feser does not give any good reasons for this.

For me, the sentence: “Every sexual act may only serve the purpose of reproduction” is not an axiomatic premise, but a possible conclusion from different premises. At the end of Feser’s remarks, a reason is finally given why sexuality must not use the genitals for purposes other than those for which they were intended. The brief justification is as follows: it is a matter of preserving the human species. Therefore, no exceptions are tolerated with regard to sex. Unfortunately, Feser does not go to any trouble to explain this in more detail. Perhaps he suspects that he might find himself in an argumentative circle: Why is the preservation of the species important? Because sex is aimed at the preservation of the species. Why should I not undermine the possibility of reproduction during sex? Because the preservation of the species is essential. The preservation of the species justifies sex and sex justifies the preservation of the species. One justifies the other and vice-versa. As I said, such a justification would be the pure circle. In my opinion, it is indeed hidden in [Aquinas’] reasoning. Elsewhere, however, Aquinas says that his ethics are simply self-evident and therefore need no logical justification. As with Moses, a “That is so, no objection!” is simply created in the moral sphere.

Aquinas brings two examples of harmless misuse: Walking on the hands or using the legs and feet as arm and hand replacements. According to Aquinas these are small sins or no sins at all. Feser gives an example, not directly for a misappropriation, but for an action which is directed against a purpose of the body, namely when one tries to clean one’s ears with ear sticks, although the ear cleans itself. According to Feser, the danger of destroying an important sense organ in the artificial cleaning process is only a small sin? If I scratch my eye with a pencil, would that be just as insignificant? Be that as it may, purposes of bodily functions can in fact be frustrated without much sin, or some bodily organs can be misappropriated if the overall human good is not damaged. I think Aquinas understands human good as self-preservation, reproduction, social life, and sainthood.

In my opinion, however, the purpose of sexual bodily [functions] cannot be frustrated (which means the same to me here: the sexual parts of the body cannot be misappropriated) because two premises stand in the way:
1) One should preserve the human species, i.e. reproduce.
2) The male seed potentially contains the complete body of the human being. So the animal soul/form of man is already completely contained in the seed.
According to Anthony Kenny, many believed in the past that the individual body existed before conception in the form of the fatherly seed (The biblical figure Onan, for example, spilled his seed on the ground, which in Jewish tradition was regarded not only as a kind of sexual pollution, but also as a violation of life itself). Aristotle thought very similarly. And why should that be only a small insignificant detail for Aquinas and the Thomists who adopt this train of thought? Aquinas treats masturbation and contraception as crimes against humanity, mind you, right after murder. Such a view is understandable in the context of a belief that, biologically speaking, only the male sex is the active element in conception, so that the semen is an early stage of the same individual who is eventually born. Masturbation is then, to a lesser extent, the same thing as an infant’s exposure. But the view that masturbation is a form of murder cannot remain, given today’s knowledge, since both male and female germ cells contribute equally to the genetic constitution of the offspring.
Premises 1 and 2 and only these together could, if at all, in my opinion lead to the ethically weighty conclusion: “Every sexual act may only serve the purpose of reproduction! Anything else would be a sin! If you drop both, however, the sexuality that prevents reproduction is obviously on the same moral level as running on your hands or cleaning your ears with cotton swabs, which is harmless to Feser. Sex for mere fun would therefore be a morally very minor matter. What happens if you only maintain the first premise, since the second one has already been scientifically refuted? The first premise is so unspecific and general that it does not logically follow that any sexual act must only serve reproduction. It is well known that the preservation of the species is also subject to other factors, such as the environment and politics; and factors such as personal maturity, health and material resources must also be considered. What is important is that, as a general rule, all human beings should, sooner or later, be expected to reproduce, and if it is intended to do so, then only in circumstances conducive to the preservation of humanity. What would not be possible and, moreover, immoral would be: self-castration, total avoidance of child making in long, prosperous and fruitful marriages, homosexual marriage and the priestly vow of virginity, whereby all woman are avoided and the sexual organ is left atrophied. Independent of all this, the premise itself is problematic. Anti-Natalism provides convincing arguments for this, whereby the first premise becomes invalid.

III. Further, somewhat less weighty, points of criticism of classical Thomistic natural law are the following: Why does [Aquinas] look [counterfactually] into human life when he wants to determine the nature of man? That makes no sense. Therefore, many of his assumptions are contrary to those of evolutionary psychologists, who really strive to capture human nature scientifically. Aquinas, when making ethical theses, seem to make moralistic fallacies that are similar to naturalistic fallacies. With the moralistic fallacy, however, the opposite is the case: from what ought to be we draw conclusions about what is. X should be. That is why X is. X should not be. Therefore, X is not. This occurs when, contrary to empirical experience, human nature is inferred from beliefs and worldviews. A concrete example: Adultery and promiscuity are wrong. Consequently, we have no biological predisposition for several sexual partners. While adultery and promiscuity may be considered morally wrong, this has no influence on the biological aspects of humans, which could include promiscuity.

The teleology of a partnership, a love partnership in which one should meet at eye level, is perhaps more realized with homosexual couples than with heterosexuals. Just think of Plato, for whom there can only be true love between men. One could say that homosexual couples miss the natural law in sexual respect, but fulfill it in a partnership respect. For heterosexual couples, it would be the other way round (If you doubt it, all you have to do is watch old talk show footage). There should be no reason why the partnership aspect of an official marriage or a normal love relationship should not have its own teleology. It should not be forgotten that most of the time of living together is spent without sex. Thus sexual deviation is marginal at least under the aspect of time.

Devils and demons, real existing beings for Catholics, also have their own teleological nature (for example, deceptive abilities that can only be applied to humans). Now this nature leads them to actions, which from our point of view are reprehensible, but from their point of view probably good, at least they correspond to their nature. Then perhaps there is no universal good?

Aristotle is far from developing a theory of subjectivity, but there is a place in his work where he comes a little closer to such a theory. There he talks about a person’s anger and transfers his famous form/matter distinction to it. The felt anger itself is the form and the bubbling of the blood the matter of this human activity and state (one can only think both together). If, however, every form always implied an purposefulness and every affect or inner inclination would also be a form, this would clearly have to be of natural law relevance. Thus Emmett Barcalow’s following remarks would be fully justified:

“It may be that human beings, or at least male human beings, are naturally aggressive and prone to violence. After all, war and fighting seem to be such universal pastimes of men in all ages that one might conclude that the inherent nature of male human beings includes a strong tendency to behave violently. If that is so, should men act in accordance with their inherent nature or should they try to resist their inherent natural tendencies? Similarly, many people believe that the image of childhood as a time of innocence and purity is sentimental nonsense. In their view, children are inherently cruel and are brought to extinguish or control their inherent cruelty only through education and socialization. Consider the tendency of children to mercilessly taunt or bully those who are weaker than or different from themselves. We might maintain that the purpose of moral education is not to encourage people to give their inherent natures free rein but rather to tame their inherent natures. Similarly, suppose that human beings are inherently selfish or primarily self-interested and that altruism is not in accordance with the inherent nature of human beings. If this were true, would it follow that altruism is immoral and contrary to reason because it is not in accordance with the inherent nature of human beings?“

What if I fall intensely in love and resist this pursuit for superstitious or other reasons? Is that compatible with natural law? Is falling in love, which I have consciously allowed, already the point of no return in the teleology of sexuality, as Catholicism understands it, and thus also of marriage? According to Feser, sex begins very imprecisely with sexual arousal (an inner state) and ends with ejaculation in the vagina (a purely external event). Establishing such a point seems to be an impossible undertaking (Feser dogmatically assumes a Platonic idea of sexuality without being able to fully define it). And yet the natural lawyer does need this point, from which there is no turning back in the physical approach between man and woman, no more possibility to say stop, and consequently only the duty exists to lead the semen very soon into the vagina (otherwise it would not be a problem if Tantra grandmasters have an orgasm during sex without ejaculating).

What about lesbian love? It may not be negatively affected by natural law. Because it would be nothing more than an exchange of tenderness, which should not be forbidden by natural law. Do women then possibly have a special status under natural law because their clitoris does not directly contribute to a pregnancy? Is there perhaps no equality in natural law if it turns out that the nature of women is a little different from that of men? You can also take a look at the phenomenon of tongue kissing. The tongue kiss may have a slightly different purpose for the man than for the woman. For the man it is a means to make the woman submissive to the sexual act. For the woman, it is, so to speak, a ” taste “, whether the man is the “right one”. for a long-term relationship. So under Feser’s conditions an executed and correctly completed sexual act would not necessarily be obligatory for a woman as it is for a man. If the “chemistry isn’t right”, she could quickly veto it and prevent any form of physical contact.

The Thomistic ethics of natural law is based above all on the Aristotelian idea that all things in nature act according to final causes. However, to discern the ultimate purpose of a thing can neither succeed a posteriori nor a priori. Every assumption of a certain purpose always remains hypothetical. It always remains open whether there is not another purpose (or a further one or none at all) or even a superordinate one, which stamps the first assumed one to a mere means. This is also Kant’s view, for which there are neither a priori nor empirical reasons for the assumption of regularity by purposes, which prove the reality of these purposes. The Bible also denies the possibility of fathoming the essence of things (Aquinas himself says that he is a man of only one book, the Bible.): “No one can comprehend what goes on under the sun. Despite all their efforts to search it out, no one can discover its meaning. Even if the wise claim they know, they cannot really comprehend it.”( Ecclesiastes 8:17)

According to Kant, a teleological view, in the sense of an analogous procedure, can be used for natural research when mechanistic laws are no longer sufficient to provide an explanation. Therefore teleology becomes indispensable, especially because one does not have to hope to understand “the production of even a single grass from mere mechanical causes” (Kant). But as an analogy, the principle also experiences its limits: To explain nature with purposes in an objective sense would be an overbearing assumption. Aristotle and Aquinas assume that the bodies of nature always, or mostly, strive for and effect the best. According to them, all things should have the best teleological goal for themselves. In order to be able to say what is best for a piece of iron, for example, one would somehow have to know in advance what is best for all inorganic things such as metals. But how should I know beforehand what the best thing is for a piece of iron under any circumstances? I could say that iron always makes the best of itself in any situation, no matter what it’s doing. When I say that, however, I introduce an aspect of value into a necessity without first having looked for good reasons for this new step. However, iron is iron qua iron and therefore does everything it does in its specific way, because it is iron. There is a pure necessity here (teleological or not), which in and of itself is value-free. According to Aristotle, a piece of iron wants to reach its natural place in the center of the universe. Because the stay at this place is good or best for that iron in terms of value. Now Aristotle could know all this neither a priori nor a posteriori. He had only suspected it from his ultimately false and speculative cosmology, so that the idea of a natural place in this form is no longer tenable. However, according to Kurt Flasch, Aquinas needs this “hidden aspect of value” in order to “see” the “first changer” as God. For Aquinas, change is “the realization of a meaningful form. With another “concept of natural processes, even an evil demon could preside over the value-free, even worthless changes” (Kurt Flasch). However, if teleology is exaggerated, i.e. if the causes of effects and the causes of purposes are not kept strictly apart and even both, including the value aspect, are united, this would have fatal consequences for natural law. It would then simply be dismissed as an ethical theory. After all, everything in the world would happen as it should, and for the best. One could, simply put, not do anything wrong anymore and not speak of mistakes, deformities or abnormalities in nature (this thought is basically given in the concept of providence). And it actually looks as if Feser, without being aware of it, was getting into this exaggeration due to all the worship of purpose and lost himself in it irretrievably.

Moreover, one always remains anthropomorphic, i.e. narrow and small, in teleological thinking. According to Fritz Mauthner, Aristotle even managed to make his teleological scale of values even narrower, even smaller. According to Mauthner, the value judgement is basically “the weak point of teleology”. “For example, Aristotle estimates animals according to their similarity to humans. But then the male sex alone gives the standard, and the woman appears as a mutilation of the man. And again the free Greek gives the standard, and the slave appears as a born slave, inferiorly created by nature. There it cannot be surprised if there are also inferior numbers, inferior veins, inferior dimensions; in front is more valuable than behind, above is more valuable than below”. (Fritz Mauthner)

In its argumentation, natural law proceeds in three steps, all of which, without exception, are highly problematic: Assigning purpose, attaching value and deriving a moral imperative. The Thomists would like to equate these single steps as much as possible, which only makes the whole thing very vague. Even the first step to accept a purpose in nature is not easy. The jump from purposes to comparative value judgements is even more problematic (also because a value stands in a double relation, on the one hand to the evaluator and on the other hand to something else). The quality standards of Aristotle, for example, which serves as a comparative value, are completely unreflected. He started from an unquestioned, time-related anthropology, probably from his proud feeling of being a Greek man and from social usefulness at that time. One could say, however, that the slightly deviant is the good, the discreet deviator is to be taken as the yardstick of the good (like Aristotle himself was one with respect to Plato or the religious custom of his polis). For without deviations there was and is no progress. At the end of the day, value assessment in one way or another is a purely subjective process, shaped by predominant ideologies, religions, philosophies, the state of the sciences, in short the zeitgeist. The most problematic, however, is the leap from comparative value judgements to non-comparative ought judgements (one could perhaps at best win recommendations from value judgements). Because the naturalistic fallacy takes immediate effect here. From a purpose which I consider to be good, and which I only suspect in nature (to be true), to conclude to a commandment which is valid for all human beings (to be valid), falls more than ever before victim to the said fallacy. My conclusion: In natural law there is clearly a false objectivity.

[To expand a bit on Mauthner’s thoughts:]

Mauthner has written a polemic book about Aristotle´s philosophy and reception in general, not specifically about his ethics. But Aristotle himself has not yet drafted an ethics of natural law. Aristotle’s ethics include only a virtue/happiness ethic and an ethic determined by the needs of the polis. The idea of natural law was originally conceived by the Stoics. Aquinas linked Stoic thought with Aristotle and Christianity, without asking himself if and how these elements could be united. He simply put them together.

Mauthner’s short book is simply called Aristotle. You can find it here. https://archive.org/details/aristotle00maut/page/10

Mauthner’s thoughts on metaphysics, including those of Aristotle, can be found in his major works: “Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache” (Contributions to a Critique of Language) und “Wörterbuch der Philosophie” (Dictionary of Philosophy). To my taste, Mathner is too nominalistic. Every possibility of knowledge is dismissed. Only pragmatic communication and poetic speaking remains, the rest is silence. But he is a very clever guy. You will find a very good book about him in English by Gershon Weiler: Mauthner’s Critique of Language 1970 Cambridge.

Because you have inspired me in your remarks on natural law, I will not withhold further thoughts I have from you and your readers. which could also contribute to the discussion, as it seems that you have invested a great deal into this topic.

So here’s some loose thoughts. I hope they’re understandable because I’m not a native English speaker:

Practiced homosexuality is rejected by natural law. What it cannot reject, however, is homoeroticism.

Possible purposes of an erect penis: From an evolutionary-biological point of view one needs such a penis for scooping out foreign ejaculate from the vagina or for penis fencing as a homosexual or homoerotic social game or for an impressive display behaviour taking place in front of women. Theologically, it may be a means of morally proving oneself in order to stand up to devilish sexual seduction in an inner struggle. Perhaps our Western culture has only obscured these goals? Perhaps our Western culture has only veiled these purposes?

In principle, sexual contraception is already established in the animal world among the sperm-selecting females (this can be found under the keyword: cryptic female choice).

According to Feser, nature wants me to make many babies. But it also wants me to have long hair and long fingernails, in other words, to become a tousle-head.

Alcohol consumption for amusement is a clear offence against natural law. Willingly expose oneself to poisoning, which leads to the fact that one only has silliness in mind or becomes very aggressive, cannot be brought into harmony with natural law. That would be something that many Catholics who like to drink alcohol would never understand. The Thomist may perhaps point to the natural-law purpose of sociability, which is promoted by alcohol consumption. But this kind of sociability has little value, because it only has a dull, seemingly happy, unbridled and primitive quality. The drunk is only for a short moment pleasing to each person present (the next day it looks different again), he is quickly tempted to embarrassment, looking for a wife with ridiculous approaches and everything that comes out of his mouth are just empty promises, bad jokes or stinging remarks.

The natural lawyer would have to show how to make a list of moral commandments in a believable [hierarchical] order (for example: murder is the worst offence and is therefore the highest priority, then follows theft, then comes sodomy, etc.). No one would say that all possible transgressions of natural law that man can commit would be morally equivalent. That would have [absurd] consequences. A further question arises when considering which misconduct would be a matter for the state, i.e. a criminal offence. Should adultery again become a serious illegal offence? Or even homosexual anal intercourse? Should the attempted suicide be punished again?

Can natural law achieve something beyond sexual questions that other theories of ethics cannot? Can natural law serve as a legal basis? Can it tell us which form of society (socialism, capitalism, democracy, monocracy, monarchy) is best? Perhaps socialism fits best with natural law? (Just think of Plato’s state, in which man cannot be free because of his nature.)

Natural law makes biblical moral commandments superfluous. For whom then are the biblical commandments, if natural law is to be so clear and unambiguous after all? For the less intelligent? Does Feser actually advocate a philosophical education for all people? Does he have a democratic educational ideal? Strangely enough, according to Aquinas, natural law is intended only for spiritual, intellectual people. The common people must adhere to the revelations. But how can an ethical theory that claims general validity for everyone be just one for a few specialists?

A man should not divorce, especially if he has just fathered a child. Without him, his child would quickly become poor. So [says] Thomistic ethics. But if a man suddenly wants to lead a holy life, he can leave his wife and child immediately without any problems. A holy life justifies the impoverishment of the child, about which the natural lawyers were concerned to the highest degree shortly before. This includes a very bizarre moral rationale. The end justifies the means here (This principle of natural law, however, is simply pushed aside by the question of artificial insemination). If there is a highest purpose for human nature, as Thomism claims, namely holiness, then this purpose should not be disregarded by anyone. The following should apply to everyone: “Go, sell everything you have and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me.” (Mark 10:21) The highest purpose cannot simply be an option. Because it corresponds in the last consequence to our innermost being, at least according to Thomism.

The Christian ethics par excellence, the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount thus, has almost nothing to do with natural law ethics. The Sermon on the Mount proclaims a pure ethics of mind and conviction. One only has to look at the passages from Matthew chapter 5,1-7,29, then one can ask oneself what they have to do with natural law. Namely, nothing. Also Jesus Golden Rule: “So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets” (Matthew 7:12) no connection. In the Golden Rule, reference is made to one’s own will, which is precisely not the procedure of natural law ethics.

The Thomists often cannot decide what is more important in an action: the mere attitude or the realization of an external form. Sometimes it is so, another time so. Everything very inconsistent. What is, by the way, with the one who adheres strictly to natural law only for fear of hell? Kant would say that his compulsive actions were only outwardly moral, but not out of a respectful appreciation of moral laws, because there is no genuine moral motive. Natural law would actually have to be characterized consistently as something purely external, the observance of which is also something purely external, so that the internal, the motive, intention and attitude of a person is irrelevant. In this way, one would have no difficulty in distinguishing a couple who uses calendars for contraception (ok for Catholics) from another who uses condoms (sinful for Catholics). Because both couples would be completely identical in their attitude. On the other hand, there are no external differences between suicidal martyrdom and “normal” suicide, so that one should not approve of any form of suicide.

At times one seems to be more important than the other, in another context the other way around. Sometimes so, other times so. All very inconsistent. What is, by the way, with the one who adheres strictly to natural law only for fear of hell? Kant would say that his compulsive actions were only outwardly moral, but not out of a respectful appreciation of moral laws, because there is no genuine moral motive. Natural law would actually have to be characterized consistently as something purely external, the observance of which is also something purely external, so that the internal, the motive, intention and attitude of a person is irrelevant. In this way, one would have no difficulty in distinguishing a couple who use calendars for contraception (ok for Catholics) from another who use condoms (sinful for Catholics). Because both couples would be completely identical in their attitude. On the other hand, there are no external differences between suicidal martyrdom and “normal” suicide, so that one should not approve of any form of suicide.

On the one hand, Feser makes strange concessions in his version of natural law. Both oral sex and anal sex (Feser doesn’t mention this one, but strictly speaking he should be counted as one as well) may belong to the sexual foreplay without any problems, according to Feser, as long as the ejaculation happens in the vagina at the end. But teleologically, the penis has lost nothing in the woman’s mouth, let alone in her backside. One must not forget. Feser had vehemently pointed out that it was completely obvious, even for the most blinded person, that the erect penis fits perfectly into the vagina, and therefore only belongs there. Here is another serious concession: sterile couples may have sex with each other, although they know that fertilisation is impossible because perhaps the woman has no uterus or the man no longer has testicles. But they should at least pretend to have children during sex, which means that the sex must end with some kind of ejaculation in the vagina. Anything else would be totally sinful. It can’t be any more absurd. Here Feser is morally much too lax. Natural law must clearly prohibit sexual intercourse when one knows that the other is demonstrably infertile, since the maintenance of the human species is crucial. Furthermore: Why should the couple pretend so. That makes no sense. If certain organs are missing, there can no longer be purposes for them. When I have no eyes, I am not obliged to pretend that I can see with them. It would only be a superstitious adherence to a mere external form or order of things. On the other hand, in some places Feser is again morally too rigorous. The adherence to an undissolvable monogamous marriage, although the husband could perhaps still provide for many women without problems and raise many children in an exemplary manner, and although his present children have grown up and become independent, is not rationally comprehensible. Therefore one can confidently say here: “One must, for example, endow the nature of man with abundant late Western cultural assets in order to be able to justify monogamous marriage or even its indissolubility” (Max Ernst Meyer) Non-serial monogamy and anti-polygamy do not belong to the nature of man from the point of view of evolutionary psychologists. Even if one were a natural lawyer, one could not accept Feser’s version. Is there any prospect of determining an objective criterion in order to agree on a uniform version of natural law? There is none because there is no objective criterion.

One can also quote Nietzsche on this subject (Beyond good and evil):

“So you want to live “according to nature?” Oh, you noble Stoics, what a fraud is in this phrase! Imagine something like nature, profligate without measure, indifferent without measure, without purpose and regard, without mercy and justice, fertile and barren and uncertain at the same time, think of indifference itself as power – howcould you live according to this indifference? Living – isn’t that wanting specifically to be something other than this nature? Isn’t living assessing, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different? And assuming your imperative to “live according to nature” basically amounts to “living according to life” – well how could you not? Why make a principle out of what you yourselves are and must be? – But in fact, something quite different is going on: while pretending with delight to read the canon of your law in nature, you want the opposite, you strange actors and self-deceivers! Your pride wants to dictate and annex your morals and ideals onto nature – yes, nature itself –, you demand that it be nature “according to Stoa” and you want to make all existence exist in your own image alone – as a huge eternal glorification and universalization of Stoicism! For all your love of truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to have a false, namely Stoic, view of nature, that you can no longer see it any other way, – and some abysmal piece of arrogance finally gives you the madhouse hope that because you know how to tyrannize yourselves – Stoicism is self-tyranny –, nature lets itself be tyrannized as well: because isn’t the Stoic a piece of nature? . . . But this is an old, eternal story: what happened back then with the Stoics still happens today, just as soon as a philosophy begins believing in itself. It always creates the world in its own image, it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the world,” to the causa prima.”

Arthur Schopenhauer, the infamous great pessimist and friend of a teleological (but not theological) view of the world, interprets nature as a blind, instinctive will to live. But instead of saying that self-preservation and reproduction are moral goals, as one would expect in natural law, he comes to the opposite conclusion. The pursuit of self-preservation and reproduction is a painful process in all respects. This suffering can never be eliminated, not even for the shortest moment. This is simply due to the nature of the will itself, which can never be satisfied because of its ceaselessly striving desire, and to the fact that there are other wills in the world which will inevitably frustrate its goals. Life is therefore clearly a bad thing for Schopenhauer. Unfortunately, it cannot be avoided that it can only be regarded as bad. Accordingly, there can only be one ethical way, namely to deny the will (one’ s own essence) through asceticism and quietism. Schopenhauer’s essentialism can therefore not be a direct guideline for morality. As a natural lawyer, you probably have to be a philosophical optimist to be convincing at all. So even as a telelogy proponent (in a non-theological sense), as an essentialist and as a Platonist of some kind, if you’re pessimistic enough, you can strictly reject natural law. Because not to be (not being) would be better than to be (being). In the same sense, one would not be able to convince Buddhists of natural law.

 

Additionally, Tru also made a couple of other recommendations:

I can recommend another essay by a critic of natural law. You can find it here:

An Examination of the Thomistic Theory of Natural Moral Law by Kai Nielsen

https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=nd_naturallaw_forum

I think that when dealing with Thomism you have to assume two ideas.

One is what Kenny writes: „As a philosopher, St. Thomas Aquinas is both overvalued and undervalued. He is overvalued by those who regard him as a unique source of philosophic truth, whose ideas can only be adapted and never superseded by later thought and discovery. He is undervalued by those who think of him as being, outside theology, no more than an erratic commentator on Aristotle.“ (AQUINAS: A Collection of Critical Essays, EDITED BY ANTHONY KENNY INTRODUCTION)

Then what Schopenhauer says about the concept of value, namely that it is already relative in definition:

“Every worth is a comparative quantity, and it stands moreover in a double relation: first, it is relative, in that it is for someone, and secondly, it is comparative, in that it is in comparison with something else according to which it is evaluated. Displaced from these two relations, the concept worth loses all sense and meaning.“ (ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics – Prize essay on the basis of morals)

In this way, if one keeps an eye on these two points, one will not be able to be misled by the whole Thomistic affair.

 

Quite an impressive set of comments! I’m definitely happy to have readers like this. In the future, maybe I’ll come up with a more particular way of soliciting and processing guest posts, these comments were a great read.

Tags: aquinas, aristotle, Edward Feser, guest post, philosophy, thomas aquinas, tru